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Abstract
With more and more personal data being collected and stored by service providers, there is an increasing need to
ensure that their usage is compliant with privacy regulations and user preferences. We consider the speciﬁc scenario
where promised usage is speciﬁed as metric temporal logic policies, and these policies can be veriﬁed against the
database usage logs. Given the vast amount of data being collected, scalability is very important. In this work,
we show how such usage monitoring can be performed in a distributed fashion for an expressive set of policies.
Experimental results are given for a real-life use case to show the genericness and scalability of the results.
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1. Introduction
The prevalence of smartphones over the last few years has led to an ever increasing amount of personal user data
being collected by the service/app providers. The collected data, if used properly, can lead to highly customized
and context sensitive services for the users. On the other hand, improper use including storing/sharing personal data
without user consent can lead to ﬁnes, loss of public trust, spamming users with irrelevant services, etc. Usage Control
deals with the veriﬁcation process which ensures that organizations only use personal data in a way compliant with
the promises made to the users.
The problem is that even for ethical organizations seriously interested in auditing their data usage, there are very
few automated tools available that can achieve this in a scalable fashion. [1] describes a scenario where rules expressed
in Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL) are monitored over logs corresponding to the database actions where
the data is stored. The monitoring framework has been applied to Nokia’s Data Collection Campaign [2], a real-
world scenario with multiple usage control policies. In the application scenario, while logs were produced by a
distributed infrastructure, they were actually merged before monitoring. This led to a not so desirable performance
while monitoring some of the policies, esp. those over longer time intervals.
In this work, our goal is to further optimize the monitoring process by distributing the execution as much as
possible. This not only allows parts of the monitoring algorithm to be executed in parallel but also performing them
locally at the sites where the logs were produced, i.e. also save on logs that need to be transferred across sites for
merging (in centralized monitoring). We show that such distributed execution is indeed possible for a quite expressive,
though restricted subset of MFOTL. Even for policies where such distributed execution is not guaranteed to detect all
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violations, our results can be used as a heuristic to determine the need for more complete and centralized monitoring.
Given the computation intensiveness of the monitoring algorithm, this is particularly relevant for scenarios where
monitoring is only performed on random samples of logs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief introduction to MFOTL. Section 3
describes the underlying distributed infrastructure. The main contribution of our work, i.e. distributed monitoring is
outlined in Section 4. We start with very restrictive policies allowing only disjunction (Subsection 4.1), increasingly
generalizing them to ﬁnally allow policies deﬁned over disjunction, conjunction and negation (Subsection 4.4). In
Section 5, we give some experimental results to compare our performance with the centralized approach in [1].
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. MFOTL
A (ﬁrst-order) signature S is a triple (C,R, a), where C is a set of constant symbols, R is a ﬁnite set of relation
symbols, and a : R → N associates each relation symbol s ∈ R with an arity a(s) ≥ 1. A (relational) structure D
over the signature S = (C,R, a) consists of a domain |D|  ∅ and interpretations cD ∈ |D| and rD ⊆ |D|a(r), for each
c ∈ C and r ∈ R. A timed temporal structure is a sequence of relational structures over the same signature, where each
relational structure is associated with a time stamp.
We remark that a timed temporal structure associates with each time point i ∈ N a structure Di and a time stamp
τi. While the sequence D = (D0,D1, · · · ) provides a qualitative ordering on the individual structures, the sequence
of time stamps τ = (τ0, τ1, · · · ) associates each structure Di with quantitative time information, where adjacent time
points i and i + 1 can have equal time stamps, i.e., τi = τi+1.
Syntax. Let I be the set of nonempty intervals over N . We often write an interval in I as [c, d), where c ∈ N , d ∈
N ∪ {∞}, and c < d, i.e, [c, d) := a ∈ N|c ≤ a < d. For the rest of this paper, V denotes a countably inﬁnite set of
variables, where we assume that V ∩ (C ∪ R) = ∅, for every signature S = (C,R, a).
Deﬁnition 1. The set of First Order Logic (FOL) formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φF ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (¬φF) | (φF ∧ φF) | (φF ∨ φF) | (∃x.φ)
The set of Metric First Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL) formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (¬φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (∃x.φ) | (IφF) | (IφF) | (φF SI φF) | (φF UI φF)
where r ranges over the elements in R, t1, t2, · · · range over V ∪C, x ranges over V, and I ranges over I. 
We use standard syntactic sugar like true for ∃x.x ≈ x, ∀x.θ := ¬∃x.¬θ, and θ1 → θ2 := ¬θ1 ∨ θ2. The classical
unary temporal operators are deﬁned as follows: Iθ := true SI θ (once), Iθ := ¬I¬θ (always in the past),
♦Iθ := true UIθ (eventually), and Iθ := ¬♦I¬θ (always), where I ∈ I. For a detailed description of the semantics
of the diﬀerent operators, the interested reader is referred to [3].
3. Infrastructure
We consider a distributed/replicated database infrastructure with (possibly) overlapping data stored at the diﬀerent
database instances {db1, db2, · · · }. Each database instance dbi contains a set of tables denoted as {t1@dbi, t2@dbi, · · · }.
The diﬀerent instances are maintained in sync by triggers executing between the instances. We consider both inline
syncs (sync with db j as soon as an update occurs in dbi) as well as regular scheduled syncs (daily, weekly, etc.).
3.1. Policies
Events taking place in the actual system are represented by predicates and the relations between them are expressed
with the logical operators. While the semantics of the operators are deﬁned directly by the temporal logic language,
we must relate the predicates to the corresponding events happening in the actual system ourselves. The predicates
select, insert, delete, and update represent the corresponding SQL statements. We diﬀerentiate between the events
based on where the SQL query is executed. Let selecti denote a select query on database dbi. Each predicate has 3
parameters:
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1. the system user name corresponding to the database account executing the query,
2. the involved table name, and
3. the involved row identiﬁer (dbkey).
Each parameter can also be unknown. More formally, the set of relation symbols ri ∈ R in our case is given as: R =
{selecti, inserti, deletei, updatei|i = 1 · · · n}, where n is the number of database instances. The arity of all predicates is
equal to 3, i.e. a(selecti) = a(inserti) = a(deletei) = a(updatei) = 3.
3.2. Logging
Each database instance locally logs details of select, insert, delete, and update statements executing at its site,
appending timestamps indicating the time of logging. (For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the diﬀerent database
instances’ clocks are in sync.) Note that a single SQL statement is capable of updating multiple rows, tables, and even
database instances. However, for logging purposes, we transform [1] the updates in such a way that there corresponds
a log entry for each updated row with the corresponding time, user, and table and dbkey values.
Let logi refer to the local logs at database instance dbi. By slight abuse of notation, we refer to the (sub)log logi[a,b]
as the portion of logi between time points ta and tb.
4. Distributed Monitoring
In [1], monitoring of MFOTL policies in a centralized fashion is described. In a centralized setting, the logs
produced individually by the diﬀerent database instances are merged into a single log and are monitored for policy
violations with a monitor.
Let φ be an MFOTL formula over the signature S that we want to monitor. In a nutshell, the monitor works as
follows [3]. It sequentially processes the timed temporal structure (D, τ) and determines for each time point those
elements in (D, τ) that violate φ. More precisely, the monitor iterates over the structures Di and their associated
timestamps i, where i is initially 0 and is incremented with each iteration. At each iteration, the monitor incrementally
maintains a collection of ﬁnite relations for previous time points. Roughly speaking, these relations for each time point
j ≤ i store the elements that satisfy the temporal subformulae of ¬ψ at the time point j. If the temporal subformula of
¬ψ refers to future time points, the monitor might need to postpone the construction of such an auxiliary relation to a
later iteration, until the processed preﬁx of (D, τ) is long enough to evaluate the subformula at time point j. However,
since ¬ψ is bounded, we never need to postpone such a construction indeﬁnitely. Moreover, the monitor discards
auxiliary relations whenever they become irrelevant for detecting further violations.
In the sequel, we show how a given MFOTL formulae φ can be monitored in a distributed fashion. The intuition
is to evaluate each predicate ri in φ independently and simultaneously at the corresponding database instances dbi.
4.1. Disjunction
We initially consider a subset of MFOTL, restricted to disjunction as the logical operator and allowing only unary
temporal operators {,♦}.
Deﬁnition 2. The set of Disjunctive Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φD ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φD ∨ φD)
The set of Disjunctive Metric Temporal Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φT ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φT ∨ φT ) | (IφD) | (♦IφD)
where r ranges over the elements in R, t1, t2, · · · range over V ∪C, x ranges over V, and I ranges over I. 
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We consider policies of the form (implication) ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) → φT ::= ¬r(t1,··· ,a(r)) ∨ φT . We also denote the
Left Hand Side (LHS) r(t1,··· ,a(r)) as rl, whenever we need to diﬀerentiate it from the predicates in the Right Hand Side
(RHS). It is easy to see that ψ can be reduced to a disjunction formula (ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∨ · · · ) where
ψi = r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | ¬r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | OI(r(t1,··· ,a(r))) | OI(¬r(t1,··· ,a(r))), O ∈ {,♦}.
Given this, the algorithm to evaluate ψ in a distributed fashion is as follows:
Algorithm Distr Disjunction
1. Resolve temporal connectives: Note that although the logs are being generated continuously, we perform mon-
itoring for speciﬁc time intervals. E.g. the monitoring can be scheduled every 24 hours over daily logs. So we
ﬁrst need to determine the sublog logi[p,q] on which to evaluate each ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) in ψ.
(a) Fix the time interval [a, b] on which to perform monitoring for this instance. For each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r))
(including rl) not encapsulated by a temporal connective, evaluate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) over the sublog logi[a,b].
(b) For each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) encapsulated by a ‘past’ temporal connective [c,d], evaluate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) over
the sublog logi[a−d,b−c].
(c) Apply the above analogously for ‘future’ temporal operators, i.e. for each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) encapsu-
lated by ♦[e, f ], evaluate ri over the sublog logi[a+e,b+ f ].
After evaluation, let ni (nl) denote the number of log entries satisfying ri(t1,··· ,a(r))(rl).
2. Resolve logical connectives: Let φ′T denote the RHS φT with the temporal operators removed.
(a) Substitute each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) in φ′T by ni.
(b) Let n(φ′T ) denote the value obtained by adding the numeric values in φ
′
T (in other words, replace the ∨
connectives in φ′T by +, and then add the ni values).
(c) Let n(ψ) = nl − n(φ′T ). If n(ψ) > 0, then there exists a violation.
Theorem 1. For a given formula ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) → φT , if n(ψ) computed by the algorithm Distr Disjunction is
greater than 0, then there exists a violation. 
Example 1. For example, let us consider the following policy:
insert1(u1, t1, unk)→ ♦[0,30]insert2(u1, t1, unk) ∨ ♦[0,60]insert3(u1, t1, unk)
assuming db2 and db3 are the backup instances. The policy states that any data inserted in db1 should be copied
to (inserted in) db2 within 30mins or db3 within 60mins.
Recall that [a, b] denotes the timeframe for this monitoring instance. Then evaluate the LHS insert predicate
insert1(u1, t1, unk) on the sublog log1[a,b]. Applying timing adjustments, evaluate the insert predicates in the RHS
subformula on the sublogs log2[a,b+30] and log3[a,b+60] respectively.
Let n1, n2, n3 denote the number of log entries satisfying the 3 insert predicates respectively. Given this, if n1 >
(n2 + n3), then we have a violation, i. e. we have a data item inserted in db1 that was not copied in either db2 or db3.
Note that the reverse n(ψ) < 0 only ‘hints’, and does not necessarily imply a violation. Recall that there is no
actual data correlation between the simultaneous distributed evaluations, as such n(φ′T ) > nl may be due to RHS log
entries not related to data satisfying the LHS rl.
4.2. Conjunction
In this section, we focus on conjunction instead of disjunction.
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Deﬁnition 3. The set of Conjunctive Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φC ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φC ∧ φC)
The set of Conjunctive Metric Temporal Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φS ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φS ∧ φS ) | (IφC) | (♦IφC)
where r ranges over the elements in R, t1, t2, · · · range over V ∪C, x ranges over V, and I ranges over I.
We consider policies of the form (implication) ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) → φS where the RHS φS can be reduced to a
conjunction formula:
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · )
where
ψi = r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | I(r(t1,··· ,a(r))) | ♦I(r(t1,··· ,a(r)).
Given this, the algorithm to evaluate ψ in a distributed fashion is as follows:
Algorithm Distr Conjunction
1. Resolve temporal connectives: Fix the time interval [a, b] on which to perform monitoring for this instance.
For each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) (including rl) not encapsulated by a temporal connective, evaluate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) over
the sublog logi[a,b]. Adjust the time intervals for predicates ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) encapsulated by past and future temporal
operators analogously. After evaluation, let ni(nl) denote the number of log entries satisfying ψi(rl).
2. Resolve logical connectives: For i = 1, 2, · · · , if ni < nl, then we have a violation.
Theorem 2. For a given formula ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r))→ φS ::= rl → (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ), if ni < nl, i = 1, 2, · · · where ni and
nl denote the number of log entries satisfying ψi and rl respectively; then we have a violation. 
Example 2. For example, let us consider the following policy:
insert1(u1, t1, unk)→ ♦[0,30](insert2(u1, t1, unk) ∧ insert3(u1, t1, unk) ∧ insert4(u1, t1, unk))
where any insert in db1 needs to be replicated to db2, db3 and db4 within 30mins.
Evaluate the LHS insert predicate insert1(u1, t1, unk) on the sublog log1[a,b]. Applying timing adjustments, evaluate
the RHS inserti, i = 2, 3, 4 predicates on the sublogs logi[a,b+30].
Let n1, n2, n3, n4 denote the number of log entries satisfying the 4 insert predicates respectively. Given this, say
n1 > n3, then we have a violation. 
4.3. Disjunction and Conjunction
We extend the previous sections by allowing both conjunction and disjunction.
Deﬁnition 4. The set of Extended Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φE ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φE ∨ φE) | (φE ∧ φE)
The set of Extended Metric Temporal Logic formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φU ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | (φU ∨ φU) | (φU ∧ φU) | (IφE) | (♦IφE)
where r ranges over the elements in R, t1, t2, · · · range over V ∪C, x ranges over V, and I ranges over I.
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We consider policies of the form (implication)
ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r))→ φU = ¬rl ∨ φU
The formula ψ can be expressed as a ‘disjunction of conjunctions’ formula (distributing ORs over ANDs):
ψ ::= ¬rl ∨ (ψO1 ∨ ψO2 ∨ · · · )
where
ψOi ::= (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · )
where
ψi = r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | I(r(t1,··· ,a(r))) | ♦I(r(t1,··· ,a(r)).
Given this, the algorithm to evaluate ψ in a distributed fashion is as follows:
Algorithm Distr Dis Conjunction
1. Resolve temporal connectives: Fix the time interval [a, b] on which to perform monitoring for this instance.
For each predicate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) (including rl) not encapsulated by a temporal connective, evaluate ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) over
the sublog logi[a,b]. Adjust the time intervals for predicates ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) encapsulated by past and future temporal
operators as outlined in the Distr Disjunction algorithm. After evaluation, let ni(nl) denote the number of log
entries satisfying ψi(rl).
2. Resolve logical connectives:
(a) For a subformula ψOi, let n(ψOi) = n j where n j ≥ nk for all ψ j  ψk, j, k = 1, 2, · · · in ψOi.
(b) Compute n(φU) by adding the n(ψOi) values corresponding to each ψOi in φU .
(c) Let n(ψ) = nl − n(φU). If n(ψ) > 0, then there exists a violation.
Theorem 3. For a given formula ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r))→ φU ::= ¬rl∨ (ψO1∨ψO2∨· · · ), if n(ψ) computed by the algorithm
Distr Dis Conjunction is greater than 0, then there exists a violation. 
Proof Sketch. If we restrict ψOi to be a unary predicate of the form ψi, then the argument follows from Theorem 1.
Step 2(a) on the other hand ensures that any redundancies due to unrelated data operations are accounted for while
evaluating the conjunctive subformulae ψOi = (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ).
Example 3. For example, let us consider the following policy:
insert1(u1, t1, unk)
→ ♦[0,30]delete1(u1, t1, unk) ∨ ♦[30,60](insert2(u1, t1, unk) ∧ insert3(u1, t1, unk))
→ ψO1 ∨ ψO2
where ψO1 = ♦[0,30]delete1(u1, t1, unk) and ψO2 = (♦[30,60]insert2(u1, t1, unk) ∧ ♦[30,60]insert3(u1, t1, unk))
The policy considers a replicated scenario where an insert in db1 is either deleted (by the user) within 30mins, or
gets replicated in both db2 and db3 within the next 30mins.
Evaluate the predicates insert1, delete1, insert2 and insert3 on the sublogs log1[a,b], log1[a,b+30], log2[a+30,b+60] and
log3[a+30,b+60] respectively. Let n1, n2, n3, n4 denote the number of log entries satisfying the 4 predicates respectively.
Given this, if n3 > n4 possibly because of additional inserts in db3, unrelated to the inserts in db1; then n(ψO2) = n3
and n(ψO1) = n2. Further, if nl > (n(ψO1) + n(ψO2)), then we have a violation. 
4.4. Negation
We extend the previous sections to allow negation. We have implicitly considered negation before (on the LHS)
as we consider formulae of the form ‘implication’. Here we try to accommodate formulae having negation in the
RHS as well. In general, it is diﬃcult to evaluate formulae containing negation in a distributed fashion without data
correlation among the distributed evaluation instances. So we impose an additional restriction here that any negated
subformulae on the RHS needs to be on the same database instance as the LHS relation rl.
568  Debmalya Biswas et al. / Procedia Computer Science 5 (2011) 562–569
Deﬁnition 5. The set of Extended Logic formulae with Negation over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φF ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | ¬φF | (φF ∨ φF) | (φF ∧ φF)
The set of Extended Metric Temporal Logic with Negation formulae over a signature S is given by the grammar:
φN ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | ¬φN | (φN ∨ φN) | (φN ∧ φN) | (IφF) | (♦IφF)
where r ranges over the elements in R, t1, t2, · · · range over V ∪C, x ranges over V, and I ranges over I.
We consider policies of the form (implication)
ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r))→ φN = ¬rl ∨ φN
The formula ψ can be expressed as a ‘disjunction of conjunctions’ formula (distributing ORs over ANDs):
ψ ::= ¬rl ∨ (ψO1 ∨ ψO2 ∨ · · · ) ∨ (ψl1 ∨ ψl2 ∨ · · · )
where
ψOi ::= (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ) with ψi = r(t1,··· ,a(r)) | I(r(t1,··· ,a(r))) | ♦I(r(t1,··· ,a(r))
and
ψli ::= (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ) | ¬(ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ) with ψi = rl | ¬rl | Irl | ♦Irl | I¬rl | ♦I¬rl.
Given this, the algorithm to evaluate ψ in a distributed fashion is as follows:
Algorithm Distr Dis Con Negation
1. Resolve temporal connectives:
(a) Fix the time interval [a, b] on which to perform monitoring for this instance.
(b) Consider the subformula ψl = rl ∧ (ψl1 ∨ ψl2 ∨ · · · ). For all predicates ri(t1,··· ,a(r)) in ψl j, j = 1, 2, · · ·
encapsulated by a ‘past’ (‘future’) temporal connective [c,d](♦[e, f ]), set variables min and max to the
minimum d and maximum f . Then evaluate the subformula ψl over the sublog logi[a−min,b+max].
(c) Evaluate the remaining predicates in (ψO1∨ψO2∨ · · · ) after performing the necessary time interval adjust-
ments analogously.
(d) After evaluation, let ni(nl) denote the number of log entries satisfying ψi(ψl).
2. Resolve logical connectives:
(a) For a subformula ψOi, let n(ψOi) = n j where n j ≥ nk for all ψ j  ψk, j, k = 1, 2, · · · in ψOi.
(b) Compute n(φU) by adding the n(ψOi) values corresponding to each ψOi in φU .
(c) Let n(ψ) = nl − n(φU). If n(ψ) > 0, then there exists a violation.
Theorem 4. For a given formula ψ ::= r(t1,··· ,a(r)) → φN, if n(ψ) computed by the algorithm Distr Dis Con Negation
is greater than 0, then there exists a violation. 
Example 4. For example, let us consider the following policy:
delete1(u1, t1, k1)→ [0,90]¬update1(u1, t1, k1) ∨ [0,10](delete2(u1, t1, unk) ∨ delete3(u1, t1, unk))
The policy implies that any data deletion in db1 is a result of either the data having outlived its retention period,
i.e. not been updated for the last 90mins; or as a result of it having been recently deleted (within the last 10mins) at
one of the replicated stores db2 or db3.
Evaluate the subformula ψl = (delete1(u1, t1, k1) ∧ [0,90]¬update1(u1, t1, k1)) on the sublog log1[a−90,b]. Evaluate
the remaining RHS predicates delete2 and delete3 on the sublogs log2[a−10,0] and log3[a−10,0] respectively. Let nl, n2
and n3 denote the number of satisfying log entries respectively. Given this, if nl > (n2 + n3), then we have a violation.
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Figure 1: Log ﬁle details
Table 1: Execution times in seconds (centralized/distributed)
Policies log1 log2 log3
insert1(x, y, k)→ ♦[0,30h](insert2(x, y, k) ∨ delete1(x, y, k)) 11056/6078 2179/1209 3180/1657
insert2(x, y, k)→ ♦[0,60s]insert3(x, y, k) 6912/4006 2962/1679 4609/2405
insert3(x, y, k)→ [0,60s]insert2(x, y, k) 7835/4615 3290/1987 5182/2718
delete2(x, y, k)→ ♦[0,60s]delete3(x, y, k) 14/10 8/6 9/5
delete3(x, y, k)→ [0,60s]delete2(x, y, k) 11/6 7/5 8/5
5. Experimental Results
As mentioned earlier, the monitoring implementation has been applied to Nokia’s Data Collection Campaign
(NDCC). NDCC started a year ago in 2009 to experiment with contextual information collected by cellphones. In
particular, potentially sensitive data is collected from volunteer participants and, after anonymization, used by re-
searchers. Currently, there are approximately 180 participants contributing data. After it is collected by the phone,
the data is propagated into three databases: db1, db2, and db3. When a suitable WLAN connection is available, the
phone uploads the collected data into database db1. Every night, a synchronization script script1 copies the data from
db1 into db2. Furthermore, triggers running in db2 copy the data in an anonymized form into the database db3. The
participants themselves can access and delete their own data via a web interface of db1. Deletions are propagated into
all databases as well.
Table 1 compares the monitoring execution times of the centralized vs. distributed algorithms for 5 NDCC usage
policies over 3 log ﬁles (whose characteristics are given in Fig. 1). As expected, the distributed approach leads to
signiﬁcantly faster execution times. Another saving in the distributed approach not evident from the experimental
results is that the logs also do not need to be transferred to a centralized location.
6. Conclusion
We focused on usage control mechanisms which aim to ensure that the usage of personal data is compliant with
privacy regulations and user preferences. Given the vast amounts of data being collected, the performance of cen-
tralized approaches leave a lot to be desired. In this work, we showed how speciﬁc subsets of such policies can be
executed in a distributed fashion signiﬁcantly improving the performance of the monitoring process. The proposed
algorithms have been validated on a real-life use case scenario (NDCC).
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